1. There is to be a White House meeting late this afternoon to decide what to do about the latest Friedrichstras a border-closing incident. My guess as to probable action: nothing.

Task Force series which, I think, you will find of interest. (In:identally, the flow of paper produced by the Task Force is staggering and I have taken it. upon myself not to forward to you 99% of it.) The first, Tab A, presents a current intelligence assessment of Soviet intentions, this being a continuation of the project which Alex launched at our suggestion some time ago. The assessment of Soviet intentions on page 2 is interesting. The second document, Tab B, gives some indication of the direction in which the European Security Study is moving.

Attachments:

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Herri di

(A) Memo re Assessment of Current Soviet
Intent ons in the Berlin Crisis: Oct. 17-24
(B) Memo re European Security and Surprise Attack

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DEPARTS OF STATE Bureau of Intel Leance and Leanarch

Research Hemorendum HSB-3.7. October 24, 1961

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INCENTIONS IN THE BOLLIN CAISIS!

CUTELLY ASISTS OF THE VICE

Negotiations, in Mai the spining of the 20th Chair desirability of a regotiate sollowing the interestive ? time publicly - that the line for a peace treaty. Cerman problem. Thrusho apparate treaty threats strond, with the Western ences to a wantowlly acc. indicate some flexibility count's the USSR to a eps bility on the terms for (level, participants, r the coreston, Khmench Much more significant Washington, and London.

on and, by Soriet standards; moderate speech at Congress on October 17, Ehrushchev stressed the mettlement of the Berlin-Germany quastion. by Gronyko, Ehrustchev stated for the first et Union would not insist on the year and doedrided the West showed a presdicters to metile the reflerated but did not dwell on or elaborate tha ing merely that a German peace treaty will be were of without them. The spite his general refer table solution, and a formulation which section to on a conference agrada as well as a desire not to the solution - Thrushehev feve no sign of flexinerotisted settlement and did not outline terms. accude of a conference, considering the nature of failure to spell out details was not surprisance terms of cultivating a climate for negotiations and instifying his own pos. On on regotioning a communist sudience was his pastalying his own pos. On on require large to a communict subtrice was his service. The service was not serviced by the servi

At the CPSU Congress, the German question was largely overshadowed by the Soviet directed Charles of condensation of the Albanian Locceration which the constituted an indirect attack on Committee Crims of Cantains and a successive and an annual and a successive constitution of the constitution the congress has strongly real limit the flexible and relet; ely moderate foreign policy line proclaimed by the 20th CP50 Contress In . 356.

firing positions.

Military Propertions and Desonatrations. Although he refrained from linking his statem as on the military superioraty of the Soviet bloc directly inning his statements on the military superiority of the coviet miss distributed to the mother than the statement of the mother statement of the coviet of the mother of the coviet of t stood in that cond the announced that the Soviet Union would test a South second The purp course of the substituted for the state of the state of the substitute of the substitu megaton rome (on the court of the new rest that the serious a washer when a first of nuclear special for the parties testing and the serious of nuclear special testing and was building a first of nuclear special testing and was building a first of nuclear special testing and was building a first of nuclear special serious and demand the nuclear special serious spe submarines armed with both belietic and terreschoming missies. Malinoval added to the cath news of Khrushchevis bossts in essential that the USSR had solved the proble of destroying rockets in flight and that the Soviet missil tiling angusting, than festing to mose much factle ice in order to take the

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Caeshoalowskis foll wed Moscow's example of extending the tours of duty for some troops. (Bill ris, East Carmany, Hungary, and Poland have already done the same.)

The lull in the barrer of large-scale ground managers are imminent. The rulk of the Polish units prosent in the GDE serlier this month have been withdrawn.

Each publicised action in the Western military buildup is reported by Moscov, but with little comment. However, the general idea of the Western military rullium continues to be played up in bloc apologatics on the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing.

Berlin and German. Soviet handling of the Friedrichstrasse checipoint incidents (ir hich US hars whose occupants in civilian clothes refused to show ID cards went through with military escorts) suched to saw a desire to improve relations with U > US on the Berlin scene, or at least stem further deterioration. However, whether this initial response represented the final Communist position remained to be seen.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET IT THITIONS

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
Khrushcher's relatively moderate statements on Berlin and Germany once again indicate Moscow (1 eager to negotiate and hopes to achieve its ends through negotiations. Khrushther's aim seemed to be to encourage a climate for negotiations, without giving the appearance of weakness or overwillingness to ease his demands.

Ehrushchev's specih will probably set the tone and manner of the Soviet approach to the Berlin problem in the near future. This does not meen, however, that Moscow will refrain from threatening language and gestures when it deems these necessary to her on the convening of negotiations or to improve its negotiating posture.

Barring a quick Soviet victory over the Albanians and Chinese, Moscov will be preoucupied with intra-bloc quarrels in the weeks to come. This preoccupation may divert its attention away from East-West issues. The Soviets will not relent in pressing the Barlin issue, but they may be willing to settle for less than they would have before.

Viewed in perspective, the CPSU Congress seems likely to produce a shift in Soviet foreign policy in the direction of a more flexible, less militant approach than has been the case in recent months. Whether this will have any effect on the immediate question of Burlin remains to be seen; there is certainly no suggestion of compromise on basic issues.

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European Sicurity and Surprise Attack

Following is a list of points concerning the subject, which appear to report a consensus of the points which have been agreed for reiging in the Cusdripartite Study coup on October 25. Frimary considerations relating to each point are so forth briefly.

This paper is circular I as a basis for further study within the U.S. element of the Study Group.

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6. Mersures to haduce the Dangers of Superise Attack and Mersuretal Par.

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Following have been suggested: Inspection zones, advance notification of major military movements or activities, exchange of military missions.

There proposals are not designed to limit forces or weapons as such, or inhibit their deployment. On the positive side they could "tip of " preparation for massive ground surprise; would tend to brush down secrety and reduce tensions! could be "trial-run" for

tachniques and neuturns to billater angloyed in development time control of A. sarkonent programs

On the suprocess side loose the problem of discrimination if the projection telego only to feveral or more previously. Manual inspection comes offer little protection.

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Ayelant long. The modeled Alleck, In general, measures of this sort could had to a false sense of security, and in the negotiation. The Suvietz would surely push toward disengantment, or telearization, etc. In any event, inspection should cover of lacets eground, sea and air and West on basis Korea et crience should not expect or risk too such.

It is suggested that the U.S. be prepared to have proposition measures that are applicable to every other than Europa, prefertily the U.S. and the USSE thereeiver.

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